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Plain English Statutes
Long overdue or underdone?
Legislators have tried to prohibit the
use of legalese. Will the language of
law ever be simple?
By Michael S. Friman

Introduction

glish[,]... use eight words to say what could be said in
two[, and].. .use old, arcane phrases to express commonplace ideas"? 3 The theories expounding on that issue
abound, but most justify (or apologize for) legal language
on the basis of judicial jargon set by precedent, status as a
member of "the club," power and money, durability, impressiveness, and a need for precision.4 However, rather
than reiterating the obvious (e.g., legal jargon is incomprehensible!), legislators have made positive efforts over
the past nineteen years to rectify the situation with plain
English statutes that mandate the use of plain and clear
language, largely in consumer contracts.5
This article will explore legislative statutory reform of
legalese and consider whether these efforts have been successful. Part I will examine the Plain English Movement
and the policy reasons behind it. Part II will further analyze these statutes and will examine the standards used to
judge plain language in consumer contracts. Part III will
examine the effectiveness of the statutes.

The language of the law, also known as legalese,
lawspeak and lawyerism, has routinely evoked such praise
as wordy, unclear, pompous and dull.' To illustrate this
description, consider the following classic anecdote entitled Gift of an Orange:
If a man would, according to law, give to another an orange, instead of saying: - "I give you that
orange," which one should think would be what is
called in legal phraseology "an absolute conveyance
of all right and title therein," the phrase would run
thus: - "I give you all and singular, my estate and
interest, right, title, claim, and advantage of and in
that orange, with all its rind, skin, juice, pulp and pits,
and all right and advantage therein, with full power
to bite, cut, suck, and otherwise eat the same, or give
the same away as fully and effectually as I the said
A.B. am now entitled to bite, cut, suck, or otherwise
I. The Plain English Movement
eat the same orange, or give the same away, with or
without its rind, skin, juice, pulp, and pips, anything
"Ask the public: The first thing they associate with prohereinbefore, or hereinafter, or in any other deed, or
fessors
is tweed; the first with doctors (a tie here) is lots of
deeds, instrument or instruments of what nature or
kind soever, to the contrary in any wise, notMr Frimanis an attorney specializing in commercial real estate transactionsand litigawithstanding." 2
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money or bad handwriting; and the first with lawyers,
written language that is impossible to understand." 6
According to George Hathaway, chairperson of the
Plain English Committee of the Michigan State Bar, plain
English is defined as:
the writing style that (1) all legal writing textbooks recommend, (2) the ABA Committee on
Legal Writing recommends, (3) all law students
study in their law school course in legal writing,
and (4) many law students and lawyers give lip
service to, but often ignore for the rest of their
law school and entire legal careers.7
He further points out that plain English should consist
of tables of contents and headings, concise and simple
words, short sentences, and active voice.' Among the evils
to avoid are: long pages of text without headings, overuse of complex sentences, passive voice, unnecessary
legalese, and multisyllabic words. 9
A common scenario in which plain English is beneficial is in standard apartment leases. The usual lease form
might contain the following confusing language:
Tenant has not at any time heretofore made,
done, committed, executed, permitted or suffered
any act, deed, matter or thing whatsoever,
whereby or wherewith, or by reason or means
whereof the said lands and premises hereby assigned or surrendered, or any part or parcel thereof
are, or is, or may, can, or shall be in any wise
impeached, charged, effected or incumbered.' 0
Hathaway suggests the following equally effective, yet
far more understandable plain English revision: "Tenant
has done nothing which would give anyone a claim against
the leased premises.""
Many observers, however, have criticized Hathaway's
suggestions and the Plain English Movement in general
as being overly critical. 2 For example, not all short sentences are coherent, and the passive voice is perfectly
acceptable when used properly. 3 Some commentators
assert that lawyers must write in a complex fashion because they are required to link complex conceptual
thoughts to develop legal theories. Therefore, they may
not utilize language as representation, as in literature, but
must use language as concepts. These concepts are inherently difficult. 4 For example, in law the word "contract"
consists of all the principles and rules of contract formation and performance, not simply a piece of paper with
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signatures and illegible fine print. 5 While the good intentions of the Plain English Movement are certainly evident, some of the principles on which it is based are tenuous. However, it is still a positive step to remedy an ageless problem.
A. History
I know you Lawyers can, with Ease,
Twist Words and Meanings as you please;
That Language, by your Skill made pliant,
Will bend to favour ev'ry Client; ...
Hence is the Bar with Fees supply'd.
Hence Eloquence takes either Side.
Your Hand would have but paultry gleaning;
Could every Man express his Meaning. 6
The earliest known plain language statute was the English Statute of Pleading of 1362, requiring all oral pleadings to be in English and not in Law French." Throughout history, many famous scholars and lawyers have
voiced their concern with legalese, including Sir Edward
Coke, Thomas Jefferson, Jeremy Bentham, and John
Adams. 8
The American movement to regulate the unclear use
of English words developed in this century at the common law level. 9 Courts of equity formulated rules for
resolving private party disputes involving misuse of language. For example, when disputed language in a contract is ambiguous, the terms will be resolved against the
drafter.20 Also, where the injured party has not been at
fault, that party "cannot be held bound by contract provisions not likely to have been comprehended (and thus
2
agreed to) by the party." '
Occasionally, the courts were kind enough to engage
in plain English when drafting opinions. Benjamin
Cardozo exemplified judicial plain English in Palsgrafv.
22
Long Island Railroad Co.
Plaintiff was standing on a platform of
defendant's railroad after buying a ticket to go to
Rockaway Beach. A train stopped at the station,
bound for another place. Two men ran forward to
catch it. One of the men reached the platform of
the car without mishap, though the train was already moving. The other man, carrying a package,
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jumped aboard the car, but seemed unsteady as if
about to fall. A guard on the car, who had held the
door open, reached forward to help him in, and another guard on the platform pushed him from behind. In this act, the package was dislodged, and
fell upon the rails .... [I]t contained fireworks, but
there was nothing in its appearance to give notice
of its contents. The fireworks when they fell exploded. The shock of the explosion threw down
some scales at the other end of the platform many
feet away. The scales struck the plaintiff, causing
injuries for which she sues.23
Cardozo's opinion uses precise words and efficient
sentences. Rather than having stated "despite the fact that
the train was already moving," he instead wrote "though
the train was already moving." Furthermore, he did not
use abstractions, archaic lawyerly phrases, or ambiguities."
American statutory measures moving towards plain
English began in the 1930s with the federal securities laws.
These laws required all publicly traded companies to disclose material information to investors.25 Next, the Retail
Installment SalesActs of the 1950s were designed to provide disclosure of terms to parties buying on time. 6 Also,
the Truth in Lending Act of 1969 mandated uniform disclosure for all consumer credit transactions.27 These statutes, however, were all aimed at disclosure, not comprehensibility. Therefore, the information disclosed was not
always ultimately useful and often was excessive, resulting in an "overload" of information.2" Thus, the "real"
Plain English Movement began in the private sector and
was designed to provide a mechanism for effective communication, rather than just disclosure of information.29
In 1974, two major insurance companies required the use
of clear, precise language in auto and home policies.3"
The most notable move in the private sector, however,
occurred in 1975 when Citibank of New York adopted
the use of plain English in its consumer promissory notes. 1
The event generated favorable publicity and was welcomed by consumer activists who viewed it as a major
breakthrough in consumer communication.32 Other lending institutions followed suit inevitably. The practice eventually formed the basis of New York's plain English statute in 1978.11 However, while the private sector's efforts
were encouraging, there was simply not enough incentive (or disincentive) to trigger widespread use of plain
English contracts.-'
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B. Federal Attempts
For that reason, the federal government decided to intercede. It focused its efforts on the language used between the parties in consumer transactions.35 The Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, for example,
provided that members of covered employee plans be
given a description of such plans "written in a manner
calculated to be understood by the average plan participant."36 In 1975, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act required that written warranties for consumer products be
37
written in "simple and readily understandable language.
Also, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978 required
that terms in consumer accounts be in "readily understandable language. 3 8 Additional federal attempts included
President Carter's Executive Order in 1978 that declared
all federal regulations "shall be as simple and clear as
possible."3 9
Unfortunately, the federal pronouncements all failed
to provide a mechanism to determine what was meant by
"readily understandable" and "as clear as possible"." In
other words, these statutes failed to provide a target group
with which to gauge the clarity of the written terms. Was
a contract to be "readily understandable" to a nuclear
physicist or someone with a sixth grade education? Efforts to establish a federal uniform standard have yet to
materialize.4
C. State Attempts
Recognizing the inability and reluctance of the federal government to take a firm stand, some state governments decided to act and drafted statutes aimed at deceptive contract negotiations. 2 In 1977, Minnesota and Maryland led the way in reforming traditional legalese in contracts. 43 These early state attempts required insurance contracts to be written in language understandable by the
average consumer.' By mid-1986, twenty states had enacted legislation requiring plain English in insurance policies, and nearly thirty-nine states had considered some
45
form of plain language legislation.
It was not until 1978, however, that New York mandated boldly that all consumer contracts be written in plain
English. 6 Influenced by Citibank's earlier development,
Assemblyman Peter Sullivan sponsored a bill requiring
that written residential leases and written consumer contracts primarily for personal, family, or household purposes for a value of $50,000 or less be "[w]ritten in a
clear and coherent manner using words with common and
Lead Articles e 105

every day meanings."47 An original provision requiring
that these contracts also use nontechnical language was
removed, indicating the intent of the New York act is to
employ a subjective test of plain English, based on the
parties involved in the transaction.48
In order to avoid a flood of litigation and large unforeseen liabilities over the law, the act not only limits application of the law to contracts with a maximum value of
$50,000, but also provides a penalty of $50 plus actual
damages.49 Furthermore, the penalty does not apply where
the contract has been performed or against a party who
"attempts in good faith to comply with this subdivision."5
While the drafters were initially correct that there
would not be much litigation over the act,5 New York's
Act has generated some litigation, which has aided those
who wish to better understand the meaning and application of its terms. For instance, in Filippazzo v. Garden
State Brickface Co., the
court held that an arbitration agreement in a con- The
it
sumer contract written in
technical language violated the New York act's
Section 5-702, but that $100
violation did not affect the
provision's enforceabil52
ity.
Additionally, in New York v. Lincoln Savings Bank,
the state argued that the defendant bank's safety deposit
box agreement did not comply with Section 5-702 in that
it was "not clear" or of "readable size," because it was
composed of over 1200 printed words crammed into 104
lines, using a four or five point type print. 3 Similarly, in
Gross v. Sweet, a private action for damages allegedly
caused by a company's negligence, the plaintiff used the
statute's criteria successfully against an exculpatory clause
in a consumer contract.
One of the most common private causes of actions arising under the New York act has come from tenants seeking to reform or invalidate their leases. For instance, in
FrancisApartmentsv. McKittrick, a defendant tenant successfully used Section 5-702 to defend himself against
the plaintiff landlord in a non-payment proceeding. 5
There, the court held that the lease was invalid under the
New York act and ordered that the plaintiff rewrite the
lease in compliance with the plain language requirements.' In addition, inBalramv. Etheridge,the court held

that defendant landlord, a successor-in-interest to the
leased property, could not enforce a jury waiver provision in the lease because the provision failed to comply
with consumer laws regarding legibility of consumer con7
tracts.1
Maine, Hawaii, and Connecticut soon followed New
York's example and enacted plain English statutes for consumer contracts.5 Connecticut's law, passed in 1979, applies to consumer contracts for less than $25,000 and any
residential lease, excluding mortgages, deeds of real estate, documents relating to securities transactions, and
insurance policies. 9 The Connecticut law also provides
for penalties of up to $100 and attorney's fees "not to
exceed one hundred dollars." 6 Similar to New York's law,
the Connecticut statute limits enforcement to executory
contracts and provides a good faith defense. 6 However,
the Connecticut statute differs from the New York statute
in the standards applied
to test the consumer contract language. While
New York applies a subjective test of "plain English," Connecticut uses
y s fees "not to
two alternative objective
tests of readability. 62 The
red dollars."
elements of these tests
will be discussed in the
following section. To date, at least eleven states have
63
adopted plain English laws for all consumer contracts.

Connectici law also
provides for pc alties up to
and attorr

exceed one hur

106
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II. Analyzing state statutes
While most state statutes differ in the exact language
used, penalties applied, and coverage, they all tend to
employ either a subjective standard, an objective standard, or both. 61The subjective tests, such as that found in
the New York law, frequently use terms such as "reasonable," "clear," and "common," while the objective tests
rely on mechanical, precise formulas to determine "reading ease."65
A. Subjective standards
A good example of a subjective standard to determine
"readability" in a consumer contract is found in the New
York statute, which requires such contracts be written in
a "clear and coherent" manner.6 Subjective tests allow
words to have meanings that can be interpreted differ-
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ently depending upon the nature of the parties involved.
While these tests have been attacked as vague and ambiguous,6 7 especially by bar associations, one commentator noted that the common law has always used terms
such as "reasonable" and "material," with68 little or no opposition from the same bar associations.
Another area in which subjective plain language statutes have been used is in statutes regarding legislation
and rule-making.69 These statutes allow the governmental bodies to set their own standards, adapting and modifying them as needed. 70 Furthermore, subjective tests allow for flexibility and interpretation dependent upon the
particular parties involved. 7' This inherent flexibility, however, has the disadvantage of requiring judicial interpretation to determine "reasonableness" in light of the parvery little
ties' subjective knowledge. On the other hand,
72
litigation has developed over these statutes.
B. Objective standards
At the other extreme, many plain English statutes, such
as Connecticut's, utilize objective standards to analyze
contractual language. 73 Objective tests are "not based on
the comprehension of the target group in light of the purpose of the legal act but only on the nature and length of
the words and sentences used."74 Specifically, the objective portion of the Connecticut statute requires such technicalities as: "(1) the average number of words per sentence is less than twenty-two; 75 and (2) [n]o sentence in
the contract exceeds fifty words... (5) [t]he average number of syllables per word is less than 1.55

...

and (8) [i]t

allows at least three-sixteenths of an inch of blank space
between each paragraph and section .... ,,76 Incidentally,
the Connecticut General Assembly counsel concluded that
this plain English statute, were it part of a consumer contract, would violate its own provisions because it con77
tains a fifty-four word sentence.
The advantages and disadvantages of objective standards are readily apparent. First, a positive aspect of objective tests is that they are precise.78 It does not take a
judge to determine that a sentence contains less than fifty
words. Also, these statutes set out specific guidelines that
any contract drafter can follow, regardless of one's knowledge of "reasonableness" in light of the circumstances.
On the other hand, the preciseness of objective tests
will probably prove too tedious for most drafters. 79 Because objective tests are intrinsically inflexible and technical, application of them can be difficult and time con-
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suming. ° Also, objective reading tests were really designed to evaluate elementary school reading materials,
and no study has demonstrated their application to complex legal transactions. 8' Moreover, requirements for
shorter sentence length and syllables per word do not
guarantee coherence. For example, both of the following
sentences would pass an objective test of "readability":
"I went to the park" and "Park I to the went."82 Obviously, the latter sentence makes no sense, yet both contain the same amount of words and syllables and would
rate equally in an objective test.
Two common fallacies have been pointed out regarding the basic principles on which objective tests are
based.83 The first is that "clarity is verbal brevity." 84 In
other words, clear sentences and words are short sentences
and words. The problem with this belief is that longer
sentences may help to clarify the action. For example,
"Bob Smith the lumberjack went to work" is clearer than
"Bob went to work." The first sentence clarifies which
86
Bob "went to work."
The second fallacy, known as the "mirror fallacy," says
that "verbal complexity reflects conceptual complexity."87
This concept means that when the words on the page are
simple, the underlying concepts will be simple. However,
this concept is false because there are many times when a
simple word will not suffice. For example, the phrase
"holder in due course" necessarily requires a somewhat
technical explanation of the rights and liabilities underlying that designation. Merely saying "holder in due course"
does not begin to reduce the vast complexity of that law.
Thus, "clarity does not automatically follow verbal brevity." 88
C. Flesch tests
While there are approximately seventy-five objective
tests of readability, 9 most statutes utilize aspects of the
Flesch Reading Ease Test developed in 1949 by Dr.
Rudolph Flesch. 9° Using the formula, a score from 0 to
100 is determined to measure reading ease and human
interest, with 100 being the most "readable." 91 For in-

stance, comic books generally receive a score of 90-100,
while scientific theories are in the 0-30 range. 2 Most state
statutes using the Flesch Test require a score of 40,91although Dr. Flesch defines Plain English statutes as a score
of 60 or better.9
The basic presumption of the Flesch Test is that longer
words and sentences mean more difficult material. 95 How-
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ever, this basic premise is not always correct. For example,
using the Flesch test, the words "probed," "deemed," and
"pledged" are considered easier than the words "acted,"
"added," and "hated" because the latter words have more
syllables. 96 Thus, the test says nothing at all about content, grammar or interest level. Nor does it exclude communications not easily understood. 97
Because of these drawbacks, the Flesch Test and other
objective tests often condemn clear cases of good legal
writing.98 For example, even though the opening sentence
of the Declaration of Independence is considered one of
the greatest political statements ever written, it receives a
ridiculously low Flesch Test score of 8.4!99 Thus, the "sophisticated" Flesch Test is far from infallible

III. Are statutes effective?
Overall, Plain English statutes have met with both
praise and opposition. However, as indicated above, not
all states have completely supported the movement. 100 On
the positive side, Plain English statutes, where in effect,
have encouraged businesses to revise and simplify their
documents. This, in turn, has benefited consumers by providing them with readily understandable contract terms. 101
New York reported that its Plain Language Law has
achieved many of its major objectives. Large numbers of
firms have revised their printed forms to comply with the
statute and have experienced no adverse impact. There
has been no flood of litigation as initially feared. New
York's action has influenced other states to follow suit."12
have been no mass
Contrary to earlier predictions, there
03
efforts to amend the existing laws.
Opposition to Plain English statutes is largely concerned with the increased costs on businesses to revise
their old contracts and implement the new ones. "n Another argument against Plain English statutes is that some
legal documents require complexity. 5 One reason asserted for the complexity of contracts is that they provide
for possible problems during the contracting period and
specify the rights and remedies of the parties. Plain English statutes that provide for "streamlining" of contracts
require drafters to eliminate these contingencies from the
contract, thus increasing the risk of liability for the parties.' 6 Even when a contract is streamlined and simplified, the resulting document may be even more complex
than the original."
Moreover, the Plain English laws themselves often are
technical and complex, and raise complicated issues for
108 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

those who attempt to comply with them. 0 8 Variance
among the specific requirements for plain language in state
statutes may lead to the disruption of interstate insurance
In addition, plain language statand banking business. 109
utes raise ethical concerns for lawyers who must assume
responsibility for the failure to comply with the applicable laws in drafting legal documents."0
Another problem encountered by the Plain English
laws is that they only cover a small segment of contract
law."' While insurance contracts are generally covered
by special statutes, instruments such as investment contracts and negotiable instruments are not covered by plain
English laws and could benefit by simplification."I2
As an empirical matter, studies suggest that market
forces can bring about most necessary changes in contract language without the aid of these statutes. "'3In fact,
plain English statutes may even inhibit innovation in simplifying contract language."' Finally, some commentators have pointed out the possible First Amendment issues involving freedom of speech which may be violated
by these statutes." 5

Conclusion
I do not hold much hope for the future of legal writing
in America. Because few sources remain for the widespread infusion of conceptual understanding into legal
education, I suspect that each generation of lawyers will
write at least as badly as its predecessor. Legal writing
will become increasingly technocratic as prescriptions
generated by unexamined premises are continually ap6
plied to misperceived situations."
The famous satirist Jonathan Swift called the language
used by lawyers "a peculiar Cant and Jargon of their own
that no other Mortal can understand."" 7 The Plain English Movement has attempted over the years to alleviate
the complexities which lawyers place on innocent laypersons. Through the use of statutory reform, both the
federal and state governments have sought to reduce the
problem by providing subjective and objective measures
with which to gauge contractual language. While not yet
widely adopted, these statutes have had some degree of
success but have also been the subject of severe criticism.
It is difficult to say whether the Plain English Movement
will grow or fade away.
In any event, while plain English statutes are a definite step in the right direction, achieving plain English
will require more than just legislation. It will require a
Volume 7, number 3

good faith effort on the part of contract drafters to provide
coherent language and to comply with the ordinary rules
of English grammar that have always produced clear writing." 8 Perhaps the following exchange exemplifies what
many believe to be the true reason for incomprehensible
legalese:
"But surely, you say, there must be some reason
for using all this jargon to obfuscate what seems to
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supra note 26, at 415-16.
65 Id.
6 The New York statute provides, in relevant part:
"Every written agreement... for the
lease of space to be occupied for residential purposes, or to which a consumer is a party and the money, property or service which is the subject of
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N.Y GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (a).
Furthermore, other states have used
New York's "clear and coherent" standard in their plain language statutes.
See, CoLo. REv. STAT. § 2-2-801 (1994);
HAw. REV. STAT. § 487A(a)(2) (1981);
ME. REV.

Spring, 1995

STAT. ANN.

tit. 10, §

1124(1)(West 1979 & Supp. 1985);
§ 325G.31 (1985); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 30-14-1103 (2)(a) (1985);
W.VA. CODE § 46A-6-109 (a)(1)(1981).
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Act, N.Y A.P.A. LAW § 201 (McKinney
1975 & Supp. 1992) (requiring that
state agency's rules, regulations and
related documents be written in plain
English). See also Lloyd, supra note
16, at 694 (predicting that plain language statutes would become useful in
this area).
7 Lloyd, supra note 16, at 695. In addition, Lloyd supplies the following test
for lawmakers drafting statutes: "Use
the simplest formulation (or one of the
equally-simplest formulations) of a
rule that achieves the purpose of the
rule, that deals adequately with the
concepts underlying the rule, and that
provides the desired guidance for those
meant to use the rule. Simplicity refers
both to word and sentence complexity
and technicality. The test for adequate
simplicity under this rule is whether it
can actually be read in the way desired
by the group to be regulated." Id.
7'One commentator argues that the flexible "clear and coherent" standard is
more useful for protecting consumers
than more precise standards because it
can be applied to a variety of language
uses and gives the state or private
claimants the ability to obtain relief for
abuses of form, as well as intent and
effect. Ross, supra note 19, at 339.
7 See Givens, Supplementary Commentaries, supra note 47; See also, supra
notes 51 - 57 and text accompanying
(discussing the limited caselaw regarding this issue).
The Connecticut statute provides in relevant part: "Every consumer contract
entered into after June 30, 1980, shall
be written in plain language. A consumer contract is written in plain lanMINN. STAT.
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75
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-152 (c)(1) (West
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Lloyd, supra note 16, at 689.
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